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ABSTRACT
Does our perception of corruption affect our interactions? This question was answered
through an experimental survey of 90 participants and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
from Transparency International’s 2017 Report. The survey revealed that those who were
categorized as low-corrupt with an above average CPI exhibited altruism towards individuals
from perceived high-corrupt regions but discriminated negatively against them when restrictions
were placed on the interaction. In the experiment, participants were allowed to give any amount
between zero and six dollars in both games. Altruism was measured through the dictator game
and low-corrupt participants were found to give one dollar more, $3.60, to those perceived to be
high-corrupt than they gave to participants who were perceived to be low-corrupt, $2.60. The
ultimatum game was the measure for a restricted environment and low-corrupt participants gave
sixty cents less, $2.80, to those perceived to be high-corrupt than they gave to participants
perceived to be low-corrupt, $3.40. Other findings from the survey exhibited discriminatory
behavior by categorized high-corrupt participants but were ultimately not statistically significant.
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Section I – Introduction
Discrimination and corruption both benefit few while causing harm to many. For the
purposes of this research, discrimination is formally defined as a preconceived opinion that is not
based on reason or actual experience (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). Corruption, in accordance with
much of the research on the topic, is formally defined as the abuse of public power for private
benefit (Tanzi, 1998). Both of these negatively affect society in different ways and their study is
important to comprehend their relationship on an individual’s behavior.
Discrimination affects the way individuals interact with each other on a daily basis.
Implicit biases generate automatic judgments and shape either negative or positive perceptions of
the people around them. Studies have shown that people default to favor the in-group over the
out group (Greenwald and Krieger, 2006). Although the decision to favor the in-group may not
occur at all times, this natural inclination leads to segregation on several lines. One tool often
used in research to measure these inclinations is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). One study
linked the IAT with discriminatory behavior and found that white students who reported to have
undesirable attitudes towards black students had negative interactions which then led to more
prejudice (McConnell and Leibold, 2001).
The practice of discrimination also has detrimental effects on minorities who experience
it on a daily basis. It is unfair to those being discriminated against as it creates an uneven playing
field where people are unable to achieve their maximum potential. One study indicates that
experience of continuous discrimination, even if benign, leads to a poorer adjustment of
immigrant Latino/as in the United States (Huynh et. al, 2012). Another study found that black
participants, exhibited an evaluative preference for white partners in a difficult task that only
6

increased the more that they accepted social inequalities existed (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles and
Monteith, 2003). In these cases, discrimination leads to decreased morale amongst those that are
being discriminated against and can be damaging to the advancement of historically oppressed
communities. One study corroborated this thought by finding that one important factor for why
African Americans do worse in the labor market is due to their names (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004). When something as simple as a name puts one person at a disadvantage
over another, it emphasizes the importance of studying discrimination.
Corruption on the other hand has slowed the economic development of several countries
across the world and as a result has put large groups of people at a disadvantage. Some argue that
corruption is actually good for a society as it leads to efficiency that works against bad policy
and creates a system where the best entrepreneurs are the ones that are able to bribe the
bureaucrats for favors (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). The argument follows that those who are
able to give the largest bribe are inherently more efficient and therefore more deserving of the
benefits that corruption brings. While the argument sounds convincing, there is a volume of
research that disproves efficient corruption theories. One study finds that those who are able to
win the bidding wars with the highest bribes are not necessarily the most efficient (Tanzi, 1998).
Other studies point to corruption as the cause of slower economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo,
2001). While corruption seems favorable in the short run, it has detrimental effects to
governments and their citizens.
The problems of discrimination and corruption indicates that there is harm caused to
people by both topics. These effects range from a decrease in morale, an inability to succeed, and
stunted economic growth. One question, which has yet to be answered directly, is whether or not
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there is a relationship between discrimination and perception of corruption separate from race
and country of origin. In other words, does the perception of corruption affect individual
interactions? This paper aims to explore the issue through an empirical survey and ultimately
answer this question. This question serves as an extension to much of the work on discrimination
and corruption and works to combine the two fields through an interesting perspective. Also, the
study of the perception of corruption and discrimination is more important than ever before in a
hostile global political climate undergoing a wave of nationalism (Eger and Valdez, 2015). In
this context, politicians from across the world have been are more discriminatory towards outside
groups.
The paper aims to empirically measure interactions through strategic games and provide a
quantifiable measure of discrimination against perceived high-corrupt and low-corrupt
individuals. Through these findings, an important question can be answered that can then lay the
foundation for research that questions why discrimination on the perception of corruption occurs.
The paper is comprised of eight sections including the introduction (Section I). Section II
is a summary of the literature reviewed that provides a clear picture of the research surrounding
the topic of interest. Section III contains the research questions as well as the hypotheses. Section
IV explains the methodology for the survey and its justification. Section V presents the data of
the survey, argues for its validity, and analyzes the results that will be used to test the
hypotheses. Section VI discusses the results and its implications as well as limitations of the
survey. Section VII has a general conclusion, the other remaining parts not divided into sections
are the references and appendix.
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Section II – Literature Review
This section contains five subsections, the first four subsections are a thorough and
relevant review of the literature of four areas: corruption, discrimination, experimental games,
and similar work to the questions posed in this paper. The final subsection summarizes the
literature reviewed and offers justification for the topic in question and its uniqueness by further
explaining the current gap in the research.

Subsection I – Corruption
Corruption is an ambiguous concept and much of the research surrounding the topic has
only been developed since the 1960s. While the study of corruption has only been a recent
development, the practice of corruption can be found throughout history dating back from the
times of the old testament to the ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
(Dimant and Schulte, 2016). As mentioned earlier, there are several theories that point to
corruption as a force for good that improves economic efficiency (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968).
These theories, one of the first in the field of study, rely on a level playing field where all players
have an equal chance to succeed and bribe and are only differentiated by their abilities to
prosper. Commonly known as “greasing the wheels,” these theories indicate that the attention of
bureaucrats can be best determined by the number of bribes they receive and will as a result only
focus on the work that is most important. This logic has been rebuked by several scholars as they
have proven that corruption tends to decrease economic growth. (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001).
While the negative effects it has on society have been proven empirically, the nature of
corruption research is dynamic and diverse.
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Bicchieri and Ganegonda’s 2016 chapter explores what drives individuals to engage in
corrupt behavior. Viewing corruption as a socio-psychological problem, they utilize the theory of
planned behavior and theory of social norms to evaluate the social and cognitive mechanism that
lead to corrupt behavior. Through their research they find that a mix of social, institutional, and
psychological factors factor influence an individual to act corruptly (Bicchieri and Ganegonda,
2016). The conclusions of this research emphasizes that the reasoning as to why people act
corruptly is not a simple concept to understand and that a multilayered approach is necessary to
enact productive policy to help curb corruption.
Fisman and Miguel’s 2007 paper uses data from diplomatic parking in Manhattan and
correlates the frequency of violations to the level of corruption by country. In an environment
where diplomats had the ability to park wherever they pleased due to immunity, actions were
solely governed by cultural norms. The paper found that the number of parking violations by
diplomats is strongly correlated with their countries measure of corruption (Fisman and Miguel,
2007). When enforcement was enacted through New York City’s change of law that did not
allow diplomats to invoke immunity, violations dropped dramatically by 98 percent. This
research indicates that a culture of corruption affects the way that people act in outside
environments, actor’s willingness to follow the law is dependent from the culture they come
from.
Hauk and Seaz-Marti’s 2002 paper explored the cultural transmission of corruption and
the effects that it has on generations. The research finds evidence that corruption is partly due to
cultural elements and a generally corrupt environment often times serves as a justification for
ones’ own behavior (Hauk and Seaz-Marti, 2002). This indicates that corruption can never be
10

completely solved due to the influence of culture, but it also does demonstrate that corruption is
influenced by generations. While the prospect of the inability to completely dissolve corruption
may be disheartening, it also emphasizes the importance of educating youth to drive future
generational change. This also has important implications for how the children of first generation
immigrants interact in a non-corrupt country and how their behavior evolves as they grow older
while being raised in a culture of corruption.
Shleifer and Vishny’s 1993 paper explores why corruption affects economic development
through the actions of government agents. These two reasons are due to a weakness of central
government and the practice’s demand for secrecy. In the paper, the authors assume the
principal-agent problem to be true, meaning that they agree that the government actor has control
over a desired good. Taking this as a given, they study the consequences of the actor’s resource
allocation. The study’s model finds that a weak central government contains too many individual
agencies to bribe and puts a burden on the investor that drives them away to a country where one
only has to pay one or no bribe (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The difficulty of navigating the
system for foreign people makes it too costly for them to seek investment, which results in less
investment overall in the country as a whole. The study also finds that the secrecy of corruption
pulls investment to less productive areas like construction while moving money away from areas
that are beneficial to society but demand transparency, like health and education (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993). Research supporting this finding has found that corruption is never good for
economic growth while also discovering that costs of corruption under regulation decrease but
are never positive (Johnson et al., 2014). As is clear, corruption is harmful to a country as it
deprives its citizens of access to vital services and pushes those resources towards less corrupt
11

countries, developing them further and increasing inequality throughout the world.
Several studies emphasize the importance of studying corruption as an interdisciplinary
topic (Dimant and Schulte, 2016; Jain, 2001). Jain’s 2001 paper stresses the need for future
research and points to a focus on empirical observation centered on a general equilibrium
framework (Jain 2001). Dimant and Schulte’s 2016 paper introduces an interdisciplinary
approach that combines different theories together to produce a three-tiered structural framework
(internal, meso and external) for understanding corruption (Dimant and Schulte, 2016). The
internal world encompasses two theories, rational choice theory and the behavioral perspective,
that explain why individuals choose to engage in corrupt actions. Research suggests that internal
factors alone are not enough to purely explain corrupt behavior and therefore one must consider
the social environment to fully understand why individuals decide to engage (Dimant and
Schulte, 2016). The meso world focuses on the social theories that create an environment in
which individuals can act corruptly. The external world refers to outside factors such as laws and
institutions that create ample opportunity for corrupt social settings to develop. In short, the
reasons for why individuals decide to engage in corrupt activities are not solely due to individual
decision making and are a mix of social and institutional rules that encourage certain actions.
Dimant and Tosato’s 2017 survey paper describes various effects and causes of
corruption that have been discovered through research. A condensed and comprehensive version
of the research listed several effects for the causes of corruption which include a wide range of
factors ranging from poverty to religion to governmental structure (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). A
clear message to take away from this survey is that there are a series of factors that may cause
corrupt societies to develop. In addition to the many effects, the causes of corruption are also
12

diverse and have been met with conflicting results (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). The survey paper
concludes that conflicting findings with earlier and more recent work are a result of the
increasingly empirical nature of the field that is now moving away from subjective inferences.
(Dimant and Tosato, 2017). The paper’s conclusions give an optimal view that the future of
corruption research will lead to more robust results in light of a growing empirical foundation.
In sum, research on corruption is diverse and has developed significantly since the 1960s.
Furthermore, it has long been established that corrupt practices negatively affect development in
already underdeveloped countries and push resources to rich governments, exacerbating
inequality. Whether influenced by familial education or a general culture of corruption, research
is growing increasingly empirical with a focus on multilayered approaches that give a better
understanding as to why individuals choose to engage in corrupt practices. One message that is
clear is that corruption’s effects and causes are complicated and a nuanced relationship between
it and discrimination requires further study.
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Subsection II – Discrimination
The study of discrimination has roots in the implicit bias that all individuals carry and it
is a topic that has been researched extensively with specificity to race and gender. Everyone at
some point in their life has experienced some sort of discrimination. If gone unchecked, it can
lead to inequality against the victims while depriving the perpetrators of meaningful interactions.
Richards and Lucas’ 1985 paper explores the topic of discrimination and the effects of
how institutional discrimination warps common understanding of what one considers to be
discriminatory behavior. Through a macro view of discrimination that takes into account how
rules organize the basic organization of communities, one can better understand how individuals
come to discriminate in favor of some groups over others. Though the paper’s approach is not
based on empirical research, its case-study on why women can’t drive buses demonstrates how
some discriminatory policy is created with incorrect inferences and ultimately makes the
institution accountable, not the individual whose logic has been flawed by unfair rules (Richards
and Lucas, 1985). Another finding from the paper also suggests that discriminatory individual
actions are actually based on inherently biased rules. These findings are important as it offers a
differing perspective on discriminatory behavior and creates a foundation for one to evaluate
individual actions in a larger context.
Lang and Lehmann’s 2012 paper provides a comprehensive survey of the research
surrounding labor relations and discrimination against blacks. While there is no existing theory
that is capable of assessing difference in wage and employment, the literature surrounding the
topic has a solid foundation through which a theory can be created (Lang and Lehmann, 2012).
14

In light of the lack of a unifying theory, it is important to focus efforts on historically segregated
communities because that is where differences are first created. When discussing how people
interact and develop their judgements it is clear that most judgements are developed early on and
are difficult to change later in life. While discrimination against blacks may not be solvable even
if a unifying theory existed, the research provides an important lens into future of research on
racial discrimination.
Research by Charles and Guryan aims to address the disadvantage in labor market
outcomes that has persisted despite the removal of exclusionary policies over fifty years ago.
Research finds that the opportunity to study discrimination empirically is at times not possible
due to the subjectivity of observational data. Despite this, there is a growing volume of work
analyzing unfair practices in the labor market empirically and discrimination theoretically
(Charles and Guryan, 2011). While there may be an inability to be able to fully study the effects
of inequitable practices in the labor market, a meta-analysis discovers that racial discrimination
against Blacks and Latinos in hiring has not changed in the past twenty-five years (Quillian et al.,
2017). These outcomes contradict the notion that discrimination has been declining in American
society and further proves that no real progress has been made in labor market hiring practices.
While the current state of academic research on labor market discrimination and the lack of
change in hiring practices is disheartening, there is a general optimism for future creative work
on the topic. Academic research on discrimination, while difficult, is important because it lays
the groundwork to help find solutions to a problem that has seen little change historically.
Two main forms of discrimination are taste-based and statistical discrimination. Tastebased discrimination occurs when people consciously discriminate based on prior beliefs of the
15

victim’s group membership. Research has found that taste-based discrimination often leads to
statistical discrimination where a manager may have an added standard of beauty for women that
is not present for men which then creates an environment where men perform better than women
(Neilson and Ying, 2016). Statistical discrimination can then be justified under this artificially
created environment. Aside from these two, there has been a growing body of research that
references implicit discrimination, where the individual is not consciously aware of their actions.
Research finds that this type of discrimination is malleable but persistent across all type of
decision making (Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan, 2005). Solutions to this problem come at a
low cost and can produce an environment where discriminatory behavior is mitigated through
simple actions.
`

Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg’s 2017 paper explores the nuance in gender discrimination

through an analyses of an online forum where individuals interact in a strictly academic setting.
The research ultimately found that women with a “low” reputation where discriminated against
by users. A reversal occurred and men than began to be discriminated against once a certain
threshold of reputation points were received for women (Bohren, Imas and Rosenberg, 2017).
These findings imply that discrimination is dynamic and changes based on reputation as people
overestimate the competency of groups that have been historically discriminated but have
achieved success regardless. This research is supported by a field experiment that concludes that
male graduate students are more likely to receive the attention faculty members than female
graduate students (Milkman, Akinola and Chugh, 2012). Female graduate students at this point
have not achieved the adequate reputation to experience increased attention that warrant the
increased attention found in other research.
16

In sum, the study of discrimination ranges from environments that encourage
discriminatory practices to nuances in how genders are evaluated. While there may be a
difficulty in empirically studying discrimination in the labor market against race, analysis can
help provide solutions to a field that has seen little change in decades. Additionally, simple
solutions to implicit discrimination can help even the playing field so that some genders are not
unfairly discriminated earlier in their career. A link between corruption and discrimination
provides an important insight to the field as it adds another layer to the understanding of people’s
actions.

Subsection III – Experimental Games
An accurate means to empirically measure discrimination is through the use of
experimental decision games. Games like these create an environment where individuals are
given a choice and are required to take attention. Different games are used to elicit and measure
the extent of different emotions. This sections provides an overview of the research surrounding
the games used in the survey.
The dictator game is a setting in which the actor is given a sum of money and decides
how much money to keep for themselves. There are no consequences for the actor because their
decision is final. This game is essentially a measure of altruism because people are put in an
environment where their actions are dependent on their own beliefs and nothing else.
Fowler’s 2006 paper explores altruism and the effects that it has on voting patterns
through the use of the dictator game. The findings from the research on altruism are diverse but
suggests that individuals in the dictator game frequently bear costs to make others better off
17

(Fowler, 2006). As the dictator game is an accurate measure for how people value the welfare of
others, the researchers make the link that a subject’s altruism correlates with their likelihood of
turning out to vote. This paper is an important example of the use of the dictator game as an
empirical measure of a subject’s altruistic behavior and sets a precedent for future research
involving the game.
Lesorog and Ensminger’s 2014 paper also uses the dictator game as a measure of fairness
and altruism to better understand cross-cultural variation between Africa and the United States.
The researchers use the double blind and regular dictator game to test for differences in the
effects of giving, the double blind dictator offers increased anonymity to the players to further
measure their altruistic tendencies. The study finds that the results did not change significantly in
the Kenyan sites while there was a major drop in the United States (Lesorog and Ensminger,
2014). The reason for these differences may be a result of cultural views of anonymity and while
there was a drop in the United States, it was not a drastic shift from the actions of their Kenyan
counterparts.
Whitt and Wilson’s 2007 paper explore the tension between ethnic groups in post-war
Bosnia through measuring fairness and giving in the dictator game. In their experiment,
participants are paired with an anonymous but ethnically identifiable player. Researchers find
that despite a bloody civil war, norms of reciprocity can emerge again and a norm of fairness,
measured through giving, persists across ethnicities (Whitt and Wilson, 2007). The implications
from this research are important as they point to the possibility of a social order following a
major conflict that discriminated against different ethnicities. Additionally, the study’s use of the
dictator game as a measure of fairness adds to a growing body of research that find the method as
18

a valid way of receiving empirical data.
Schurter and Wilson’s 2009 paper investigates the nuances between justice and fairness
and utilizes the dictator game to deepen understanding in the differences between the two
concepts. While it is found that approximately seventy percent of dictators give around twentyfive to the other player, the terms of justice and fairness are used interchangeably (Forsythe et
al., 1994). Through a series of treatments, research shows that justice is what legitimizes
property rights in the dictator game as participants do not respond to fairness in significant ways
(Schurter and Wilson, 2009). Understanding these nuances are important as they expand one’s
grasp of the benefits and drawbacks that the dictator game has to offer. Other research finds a
significant difference when presenting the terms of the game as taking rather than giving,
signifying that the norms of an institution play a large factor in determining outcomes (List,
2007).
Another games used in the survey is the ultimatum game. In this setting, there is a shared
pool of money and participants are either givers or receivers. The giver decides how much to
keep for themselves and how much to give to the other person. The receiver can decide to either
accept or reject the offer, if they accept then both get what the giver decided but if they reject
than neither party receives anything.
Gaula’s 2008 paper on the ultimatum game points to its versatility to measure differences
in culture and habits among participants. The paper emphasizes that the ultimatum game can
only be used a measurement tool if proper standardization has been achieved (Gaula, 2008). The
tool has been used to measure generosity and cooperation in many different types of society’s
19

across the world. One field experiment in Tanzania found that a low amount of sharing occurs
when people are unable to be sanctioned for their actions (Marlowe, 2004). Another study done
in the Ecuadorian Amazon forest points to in-group differences between indigenous people as
the reason for why individuals from a less stable political structure share less on average (Patton,
2004). Ultimately, while the ultimatum game is not a perfect measure for measuring fairness and
trust among others, it does provide a platform for such experiments to take place.
All in all, the ultimatum and dictator games offer an opportunity to empirically study
discrimination as it presents users with an environment where a decision must be made that relies
only on assumptions made by the participant. The dictator game, with a setup that allows the
subject to make a decision with no repercussions, offers an accurate measure for the altruism
towards different populations. The ultimatum game adds an additional caveat to the environment
where individuals must make a decision with fear of rejection. This makes the interaction more
complicated as it forces decision makers to actively think about the background of the person
they are interacting with and evaluate how fair they perceive the interaction to be. This is
especially difficult when the two partners in the game come from different cultural backgrounds.

20

Subsection IV – Similar Work
While the topic of corruption-based discrimination is niche, there is some existing
literature in the field that deals with the perception of immigrants. One paper in particular that
does hold some similarity to the topic of this thesis is Barr and Serra’s 2010 experimental
analysis on corruption and culture. In their two-part study, their findings from 2005 led them to
be able to predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home
country among undergraduate students but not graduate students (Barr and Serra, 2010). While
there may be various reasons for why this takes place, some of it can be explained as a result of
selection pool and length of time in the country. These experiments were replicated in 2007 and
the same outcome occurred, they could predict corrupt behavior among undergraduates but not
graduate students. This study reveals that the propensity to engage in corruption comes in part
from the culture that one was raised in. While there is some evidence for this, the inability to
predict corrupt behavior in graduate students and the decrease in corrupt actions that come from
an extended stay in the United Kingdom ultimately argue that it is not fair to judge immigrants
solely on the basis of their home country (Barr and Serra, 2010).

Subsection V – The Gap in Research
While the literature reviewed is extensive, discrimination on the basis of corruption has
not been directly studied by any of the work that has been assessed. The area of corruption has
undergone tremendous change in the past 60 years. While the notion that corruption negatively
affects economic development has been confirmed, the field is growing increasingly more
empirical with a larger focus on objective results. The best way study corruption is through a
21

multilayered approach coming from an interdisciplinary perspective. Research on discrimination
has long focused on unfair hiring practices in the labor market with a specific focus on its effects
on race and gender. The field has been historically difficult to analyze empirically, but research
on racial discrimination can better influence policy decisions to an issue that has seen no change
in the past 25 years. Additionally, research on gender finds discrimination early one in one’s
career with an overcompensation once someone has achieved success. Lastly, experimental
games have been used as an empirical measure of altruism and fairness by a large volume work
as it creates an ideal environment where a participant makes a decision with limited information.
Experimental games allow researchers to isolate variables where one is able to measure under
specific outcomes.
As can be seen, there is a gap in the research when combining the fields of corruption and
discrimination. The field of corruption has long studied its causes and effects while emphasizing
its complex nature but has yet to directly investigate the effects of the perception of corruption.
The field of discrimination has extensively researched the effects of prejudiced behavior on race
and gender but has yet to directly link how an individual’s perception of corruption affects the
way they interact with others. Also, the topic of this paper is similar in design to the work of Barr
and Serra’s 2010 research, it does not aim to predict if individuals will engage in corrupt
behavior. The purposes of this study are to establish if discrimination solely on the basis of
corruption exists. While the work is also done in a university setting, the goals of the research are
different.
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Section III – Research Questions & Hypotheses
Following a thorough review of the literature, a further inquiry into the relationship
between the perception of corruption and discrimination would be beneficial to the existing
literature as it examines the nuanced relationship of people’s beliefs and the impacts it may have
on everyday interactions. Through two experimental tools, the dictator and ultimatum game, I
aim to explore if one’s perception of corruption actually does affect interactions. In order to
better understand this discrimination, the following hypotheses have been created to further
explore the topic.
H1 – Individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries will discriminate negatively against
people from perceived high-corrupt countries.
The following hypothesis is motivated by the fact that many people carry an implicit bias
with them. Previous research has demonstrated that all individuals carry some sort of bias where
people make assumptions depending on beliefs of the overall group that may not always be fair
(Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, and Monteith, 2003; Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan, 2005). In a
setting where people are unable to know anything about the person except for the type of
corruption prevalent in the region of the world that they come from, I predict that participants
will use the only information available to them to make a negative judgement and give less
money.
The claims for the sub-hypotheses are made in relativity to how much perceived lowcorrupt individuals give to individuals from perceived low-corrupt regions.
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H1_a – Individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries will give less in the dictator game to
individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries.
Previous research cited finds that even among major differences and a bloody civil war,
people still tend to give equally to the other group (Whitt and Wilson, 2007). Despite this, I
predict that the participants in the experiment will share no relationship whatsoever with the
individuals they are interacting with. The findings by Whitt and Wilson, while valid, study the
effects of giving in the dictator game with people from the same country. Having a shared past,
however violent it may have been, creates a common experience that makes you more likely to
give. Additionally, the setting in which participants are put in has no sanctions for allowing them
to keep more of the money (Marlowe, 2004). It is expected that there will be some giving as no
one follows the complete rational model of keeping it all (Forsythe et al., 1994).
H1_b – Individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries will offer less in the ultimatum game to
individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries.
Building off the reasoning for the past sub-hypothesis, if individuals are already offering
less in an environment with no restrictions, then they are less likely to give more in a setting
where their offer has a chance of rejection. Additionally, research has stated that corruption is a
complex topic and factors that push an individual to act corruptly are a mix of social,
psychological, and institutional factors (Bicchieri and Ganegonda, 2016). With this research in
mind, it is unreasonable to assume that all participants of this experiment will come in with a
deep understanding and instead will purely make a judgement on the region that they come from.
As such, one can expect that we will see less giving in the ultimatum setting as well.
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H2 – Individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries will discriminate negatively against
people form perceived high-corrupt countries.
The following hypothesis is motivated by research that indicates that people from the
same in-group will discriminate against their own in favor of the group that is perceived as more
desirable, especially if they are made more aware of the social inequalities (Ashburn-Nardo,
Knowles and Monteith, 2003). Another reason as to why people from perceived high corrupt
countries will discriminate against each other is because there is not a strong sense of an ingroup. The only information that participants are given are the type of corruption that exists in
region of the world that the other person comes from. This is not enough to foster reciprocity.
As in the last hypothesis, the claims for the sub-hypotheses are made in relativity to how
much perceived high-corrupt individuals give to individuals from perceived low-corrupt regions.
H2_a – Individuals form perceived high-corrupt countries will give less in the dictator game to
individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries
Much of the same reasoning that was made for the last hypothesis also applies here, even
people that are perceived as corrupt because of their country of origin will make the same
assumptions when deciding how to allocate money and what to keep for themselves. As was
discussed earlier, even people who grew up in a culture of corruption are likely to have the same
views towards perceived corrupt individuals.
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H2_b – Individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries will offer less in the ultimatum game
to individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries
As was argued previously for H1_b, the reasoning that holds for the ultimatum game
remains. If a participant is already expected to give less under the dictator game with no
restrictions placed, they will give les in a setting that has a possibility for rejection.
H3 – In a dice game where people self-report their outcome, high-corrupt individuals are more
likely to cheat.
While this hypothesis is not the main topic of this paper, it will be interesting to see if
previous research on a culture of corruption holds true. Past research states that a culture of
corruption is learned early in one’s life and will continue to affect one’s actions in the future
even if it is slightly mitigated by living in a perceived non-corrupt country (Barr and Serra, 2010;
Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Hauk and Seaz-Marti, 2002). Additionally, research has found that
20% of people participating in a dice experiment will cheat to the fullest extent possible
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). In this model, one should expect to see a higher
percentage of those who are categorized as corrupt cheat and report a higher dice roll than was
actually rolled.
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Section IV – Methodology
The following section will provide an explanation of the design of the experiment and
will be organized into the following subsections: reasoning to use the Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index, categorization of participants, and survey design.

Subsection I – Why Transparency International’s CPI?
The list of indexes used to measure corruptions are vast, they are well summarized in
Jain’s 2001 paper which lists some of the most influential as: the index provided by International
Country Risk Guide in their annual report, the World Economic Forum’s World Competitiveness
Report, and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (Jain, 2001). While
neither is perfect, each index has been widely used in research and each presents their benefits
and flaws. The World Competitiveness Report while having been measured since 1989, is not the
main focus for the World Economic Forum as it is part of a larger attitudinal survey and thus
cannot be guaranteed to have the same amount of care required to be used for academic research
(Jain 2001). The International Country Risk Guide is an excellent measure for looking at
corruption across time because it has been available since 1984 (Dimant, Kreiger and Mierreiks,
2013). On the other hand, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is
unable to be measured across time as the tools for measurement change year over year
(Stephenson, 2014). While it may be difficult to look at results across time, the CPI’s analysis of
13 data sources includes the PRS Group’s ICRG, the African Development Bank’s Country
Policy and Institutional Assessment, and the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion
Survey among many others (Corruption Perceptions Index 2017: Full Source Description, 2017).
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Their comprehensive analysis from sources across the world help capture a unique global
snapshot of the perception of corruption in the present day. Additionally, this research is only
concerned with the most recent perception of corruption and does not need to analyze a country’s
past CPI.

Subsection II – Categorization of Participants
The field survey had a total of 90 respondents that ranged in age and cultural background.
Each participant was affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania, either as an undergraduate
student, graduate student, staff or faculty. Subjects were given an average CPI that took the
average CPI scores of the country in which they, their parents, and grandparents were born in. If
either two of their parents or grandparents were from different countries, the scores would then
be averaged for that generation which would then produce a single CPI for that generation. The
three CPIs are then averaged out to give one average CPI for the participant. Support for this
methodology stems from existing literature of the effects that a culture of corruption has on an
individual (Hauk and Seaz-Marti, 2002). Those with an average CPI greater than 50 were
categorized as low-corrupt individuals and those with an average score lower than 50 were
categorized as high-corrupt individuals. The categorization does not take into account their age
or affiliation with the university.
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Subsection III – Survey Design
The survey was prepared using Qualtrics software and took participants an average time
of three minutes to finish. All surveys were administered in person and the link to the survey was
never publicized online. It was composed of three separate tasks: pink, purple and blue. The
decision to color code the tasks was made after receiving guidance from my advisor so that it
would mitigate any confusion of having numbered tasks. The pink task is the dictator game, the
purple task is the ultimatum game and the blue task is the dice game. Participants were
incentivized to take the survey seriously through the possibility of winning $25. This was done
purposefully as individually paying each participant any amount of money over a dollar would
have cost significantly more and the prospect of winning a larger amount of money for a
relatively easy task as opposed to being guaranteed a small amount has been found to improve
performance (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). The monetary incentive is persistent throughout the
experiment by design. The amount of money the individual decides to keep in the pink task
directly translates to the amount of raffle tickets they will receive. In the purple task, the amount
of money they decide to keep also directly translates to the number of raffle tickets they will
receive. In the blue task, the number they report on the dice roll will give them that many raffle
tickets times 10. For example, if someone reports a 3, they will get 30 raffle tickets. The task that
will be selected to determine the amount of raffle tickets a participant will receive will be
selected randomly and then the winner of the raffle will be determined through a randomized
process.
The first screen participants see is purely information regarding the layout of the
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experiment. Respondents were assured that all of their answers were anonymous and that
researchers had no way of connecting their responses to the individual. The next part of the
survey randomly assigns them to be placed with either a corrupt or non-corrupt individual, they
are told that they are either paired with someone from a red or dark red region, meaning corrupt,
or someone from an orange or yellow region, meaning not-corrupt. They are also shown a map
of the world with countries shaded on a scale form light yellow to dark red. Dark red indicates
that a country is highly corrupt and light yellow indicates that a country is very clean, any shade
between those two colors corresponds to the country’s CPI score.
In both the pink and purple task they are given the options to give any amount between
one and six dollars, participants are only allowed to give whole dollars. This range was
determined by the number of sides in a die. This allows for randomization of which task will be
selected for the raffle and incentivizes participants to put a genuine effort into each section.
Participants are also reminded of who they were paired with, either individuals from perceived
corrupt or non-corrupt countries during both tasks. At the bottom of each screen is also the same
map of the world that is shown in the informational screen. In the pink task they are shown the
rules for the dictator game where they are allowed to keep any amount between one and six
dollars. In the purple task they are shown the rules for the ultimatum game where participants are
put in the environment to make a decision on how much money, between one and six dollars, to
keep for themselves. While the original version of the game divides people up into givers and
receivers, there is no benefit to having participants act as receivers because there is no
measurable action on their part other than having them accept or reject the offer. As a result, all
participants are givers in this experiment. In the blue task they are given a physical die by the
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administrator of the survey and area asked to roll it. The decision to give a physical die instead of
an online randomization tool was done purposefully to mitigate any subconscious concerns of
the fairness of the roll. Once they roll, they report the number, between one and six, on the
survey. Lastly, respondents answer a couple of demographic questions that include gender, age,
level of education and where they, their parents and grandparents are from. They also have the
opportunity to enter an email if they wish to be entered in the raffle.
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Section V – Results
The following section will consist of four subsections where the first subsection
will be on overview of the data in general and the next three subsections will organize the
findings relevant to each hypothesis. For validation, I chose to use to conduct a Mann-Whitney U
Test for a one-tailed hypothesis at a significance level of .05. The reasoning for using a onetailed hypothesis was mainly due to the fact that each one of my hypotheses predicts a movement
in one direction. After receiving guidance from my research advisor, I chose to use the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U Test primarily because it is normally used with experimental data
and does not make assumptions about its distribution.

Subsection I – General Overview
Table 1.1 – Breakdown of Data by Gender
Corrupt

Non-Corrupt

Total

Females

25

19

44

Males

20

26

46

Total

45

45

90

Table 1.2 – Breakdown of Randomized Pairings
Paired with Corrupt

Paired with Non-Corrupt

Total

Females

24

20

44

Males

22

24

46

Total

46

44

90
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Table 1.3 – Breakdown of CPI Averages by Gender

Corrupt

Non-Corrupt

Average

Females

43

63

53

Males

41

67

54

Average

42

65

53.5

The three tables above provide a general understanding of the participants of the survey
and their parings, Table 1.1 shows fairly even breakdown of genders with 44 females and 46
males participating. Table 1.2 presents approximately equal randomized pairings, with 46
participants paired with someone from a perceived-corrupt region and 44 paired with someone
from a perceived low-corrupt region. The average CPI for males and females was similar, 53
and 54 respectively. The difference in average CPI between corrupt and non-corrupt males (26)
was slightly higher than it was for females (20). With the total difference between categorized
corrupt and non-corrupt participants in between the difference of the two genders (23).
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Subsection II – Findings Relevant to Hypothesis 1
Chart 2.1 – Giving from Low-Corrupt Individuals in the Dictator Game

H1_a
6

5
3.6

4

2.6

3
2
1

0
Low-Corrupt Giver
Giving to Low-Corrupt

Giving to High-Corrupt

Chart 1 illustrates that individuals who were categorized as low-corrupt gave $1 more on
average to individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries. This finding goes against the
original hypothesis for H1_a. The Mann-Whitney U test on a one-tailed hypothesis at p < .05
produced a Z-Score of 1.72906, a U-Value of 175.5 and a p-value of .04182 meaning that the
result is significant.

34

Chart 2.2 – Giving from Low-Corrupt Individuals in the Ultimatum Game

H1_b
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Giving to High-Corrupt

Chart 2.2 confirms H1_b and finds that low-corrupt participants give less to individuals
from perceived-high corrupt countries in ultimatum game. They give around $0.60 less to
someone from a perceived high-corrupt country relative to the amount given to individuals from
perceived low-corrupt countries. The Mann-Whitney U test on a one-tailed hypothesis at p < .05
produced a Z-Score of -2.1841, a U-Value of 155.5 and a p-value of .01463 meaning that the
result is significant.
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Subsection III – Findings Relevant to Hypothesis 2
Chart 3.1 – Giving from High-Corrupt Individuals in the Dictator Game

H2_a
6
5
4

3.3

3.1
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1
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High-Corrupt Giver
Giving to Low-Corrupt

Giving to High-Corrupt

Chart 3.1 confirms H2_a and finds that high-corrupt will give more to individuals from
perceived low-corrupt countries in the dictator game. They give $0.20 more on average relative
to how much is given to perceived high-corrupt individuals. The Mann-Whitney U test on a onetailed hypothesis at p < .05 produced a Z-Score of 0.42006, a U-Value of 234 and a p-value of
.33724 meaning that the result is not significant.
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Chart 3.2 – Giving from High-Corrupt Individuals in the Ultimatum Game

H2_b
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Giving to High-Corrupt

Chart 3.2 confirms H2_b and finds that high-corrupt participants will give more to
individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries in the ultimatum. They give $0.60 more on
average relative to how much is given to perceived high-corrupt individuals. The Mann-Whitney
U test on a one-tailed hypothesis at p < .05 produced a Z-Score of 1.23747, a U-Value of 198 and
a p-value of .10749 meaning that the result is not significant.
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Subsection IV – Findings Relevant to Hypothesis 3
Table 4.1 – Frequency of Reported Die
Number on Die Number of Times Reported
1
8
2
10
3
16
4
18
5
18
6
20
Total
90

Chart 4.2 – Average CPI for each number rolled in the Dice Game

Dice Game
Average CPI Score of Participant

70

62

58

57

60

53

49

48

50
40
30
20
10
0
1

2

3

4

Dice Roll

38

5

6

Table 4.1 shows the frequency that each number was reported by participants. The
average should have been fifteen but numbers four, five, and six exceed that by at least three.
Additionally, number six is reported twenty times which is five more than the average. Chart 4.2
illustrates the average CPI score per participant for each dice roll. As each dice roll was
completely random, we should expect the average to be even for each number and around the
total average CPI of 53.5. In short, Table 4.1 demonstrates that people reported more than the
average for half of the rolls that would generate more raffle tickets and Chart 4.2 that the average
CPI of the reporter is lower for numbers three and six. No Mann-Whitney U Test was done to
test this hypothesis as it was just a simple observation that was not the main focus of the
experiment. Regardless, it is interesting to see behavior on this type of experiment and see the
differences in average CPI for each number.
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Section VI – Discussion & Limitations
Subsection I – Discussion of Results
One can say definitively say that some discrimination occurs based on perception of
corruption among those that are categorized as low-corrupt. H1_a is disproven and actually sees
that low-corrupt participants give on average one dollar more to people from perceived highcorrupt countries in the dictator game. In hindsight, this outcome does have reason as the dictator
game is ultimately a measure of altruism (Fowler, 2006; Lesorog and Ensminger, 2014). One
explanation is that this interaction is seen as a case of charity and participants associated highcorrupt regions with the developing world. This notion is supported by research that has shown
that corruption does negatively affect development and leads to slower economic growth
(Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). Therefore, it makes sense that low-corrupt individuals are more likely
to give to those with worse circumstances in a setting that faces no repercussions for actions.
H1_b is also proven as low-corrupt givers gave $0.60 more to those from perceived low-corrupt
regions relative to the amount they gave to those from perceived high-corrupt regions. Future
research should focus on why we see this reverse in giving from low-corrupt individuals when
the environment is changed slightly between the dictator and ultimatum games.
While the predictions for both H2_a and H2_b were correct, no conclusive statements
can be made as neither result was statistically significant. Despite this, one can say that it is
interesting to see that high-corrupt individuals did discriminate against perceived high-corrupt
people and chose to give more to perceived low-corrupt people. Future research should focus on
this question with a larger sample size to determine if any discrimination can be found to be
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statistically significant.
H3 was not the main focus of the paper and cannot be proven to be statistically
significant but it is interesting to see that there is some over reporting done in order to get more
raffle tickets. Future research with a larger sample size should dive further into this phenomenon
to determine if this behavior persists and if there is some link between this and a culture of
corruption.
The results of this experiment confirm that there is some discrimination based on one’s
perception of corruption. One finding indicated that discriminatory behavior changes when
presented in the setting of dictator versus an ultimatum game. A setting like the dictator game
with no consequences evokes altruism and encourages people to give more. A setting like the
ultimatum game creates a risk of rejection and causes low-corrupt individuals to reverse their
behavior and give less to those form a perceived high-corrupt country. Now that this has been
established, the next question to investigate is why this discrimination happens.

Subsection II – Limitations
Throughout the course of the research there were several limitations that should be taken
into account when analyzing the results. The first is that each survey was administered in person
which may have negatively affected the way people approached some of the tasks. While I
maintained a consistent demeanor across all participants, there was a differences in age and the
dynamics of the relationship between the participants and I. Some of the survey respondents
were my close friends and others were complete strangers and this may have led people to
answer dishonestly.
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When categorizing participants as corrupt and non-corrupt, averaging the CPI for three
generations assumed an equal influence of parents and grandparents when this may not
necessarily always be the case. Additionally, averaging out the CPI for one generation in the case
where people had parents or grandparents from different countries also assumed equal influence
of both the paternal and maternal figures during childrearing which may not always be the case.

Section VII – Conclusion
A survey of 90 respondents affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania was conducted
and determined that low-corrupt individuals are altruistic towards people from perceived highcorrupt countries in the dictator game by giving them a dollar more, $3.60, than they gave to
people from perceived-low corrupt countries, $2.60. However, these same participants
discriminate negatively against perceived high-corrupt individuals in the ultimatum game by
giving them sixty cents less, $2.80, then they gave to perceived low-corrupt individuals, $3.40.
Other findings that ultimately were not statistically significant found that that high-corrupt
individuals discriminated negatively against other perceived high-corrupt individuals in the
dictator and ultimatum games and end up giving more money to perceived low-corrupt
individuals. There was a third experiment that observed a below average CPI score among those
that reported a roll of six. While there cannot be final conclusion from this experiment as it was
not statistically proven nor the main focus of the study, it does present a noteworthy link between
a culture of corruption and cheating that can be explored in further research.
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Appendix - Survey
Screen 1 – Instructions
The survey will take approximately 5 minutes to complete and will consist of three separate parts
(pink, purple, and blue). All responses are anonymous and the researcher will have no way to
identify your responses with you.
We will be randomly choosing one of the three parts to be selected as entries into a raffle for a
$25 Amazon Gift Card.
Please click the next button to begin.
Screen 2 – Informational
You will be interacting with another participant through several exercises. To provide some
background on your participant, they are originally from a country that is marked either orange
or yellow on the map and are currently living in the United States. Examples of orange or yellow
regions include North America and Continental Europe.
[If paired with corrupt it would state:
You will be interacting with another participant through several exercises. To provide some
background on your participant, they are originally from a country that is marked either red or
dark red on the map and are currently living in the United States. Examples of red or dark red
regions include Latin America, Africa, and Asia.]
This map measures the perceived misuse of public power for private benefit and was put together
by Transparency International through expert assessment and opinion surveys on each country.
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Screen 3 – Pink Task

You are now in the pink task.
You have been given $6. In this situation you have been paired with another person from a
country that is either red or dark red on the map below who has $0. Examples of orange or
yellow regions include North America and Continental Europe.
[If paired with corrupt it would state:
You have been given $6. In this situation you have been paired with another person from a
country that is either red or dark red on the map below who has $0. Examples of red or dark red
regions include Latin America, Africa, and Asia.]
You can keep money or give money to this person, all or any portion of $6. You will have no
interaction with this person in the future.
You may give money only in increments of $1. You may give away an amount ranging from $0
to $6. The decision of how much to give is entirely yours. Please carefully decide on the amount
corresponding to what you would do in this situation.
All of your answers are entirely anonymous and the researchers have no way of linking them to
you or to anybody else in this experiment.
This task may be one of three randomly selected to be entered as tickets into the raffle for an $25
Amazon Gift Card.
How much will you give?
Slider with choices between $1 - $6
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Screen 4 – Purple Task

You are now in the purple task.
In this situation you have been paired with another person from a country that is either orange or
yellow on the map below. Examples of orange or yellow regions include North America and
Continental Europe.
[If paired with corrupt it would state:
In this situation you have been paired with another person from a country that is either red or
dark red on the map below. Examples of red or dark red regions include Latin America, Africa,
and Asia.]
Both of you have been given a pool of $6 and you have been randomly assigned the role of
giver.
You decide how you will to split the $6 with the other person, the other person will then have the
opportunity to accept or reject your offer. If they accept then both of you will receive the money
agreed upon, if they reject then neither of you will be given any money.
The slider below measures the money you will keep. You may keep only in increments of $1.
You may keep an amount ranging from $0 to $6. The decision of how much to keep is entirely
yours. Whatever you do not keep will be given to the other participant. Please carefully decide
on the amount corresponding to what you would do in this situation. (For Example: If you decide
to keep $2, the other person will get $4)
All of your answers are entirely anonymous and the researchers have no way of linking them to
you or to anybody else in this experiment.
This task may be one of three randomly selected to be entered as tickets into the raffle for an $25
Amazon Gift Card.
This slider measures the amount of money you are deciding to keep for yourself and the number of extra
raffle tickets.

How much money will you keep for yourself?
Slider with choices between $1 - $6
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Screen 5 – Blue Task

You are now in the blue task.
The dice you roll will determine the number of raffle tickets you will receive times 10. For
example, if you roll a 4 you will receive 40 entries into the raffle.
All of your answers are entirely anonymous and the researchers have no way of linking them to
you or to anybody else in this experiment.
This task may be one of three randomly selected to be entered as tickets into the raffle for an $25
Amazon Gift Card.
Please click next when you have finished reading these instructions.
Screen 6 – Instruction
Please now direct the experimenter to give you a cup and a die, test the die to determine if its fair
and then click next.
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Screen 7 – Dice Roll
Report your dice roll.
•
•
•
•
•
•

1 [10 Extra Raffle Tickets]
2 [20 Extra Raffle Tickets]
3 [30 Extra Raffle Tickets]
4 [40 Extra Raffle Tickets]
5 [50 Extra Raffle Tickets]
6 [60 Extra Raffle Tickets]

Screen 8 – Demographic Information
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

What is your gender?
o Male
o Female
o Other _____
Which category below includes your age?
o 21 or younger
o 22 – 35
o 35 or older
What is your highest level of education obtained?
o Middle School or less
o High school
o Higher Education (College and Above)
What country were you born in?
o ______________
What country were your parents born?
o ______________
What country were your grandparents born?
o ______________
If you wish to be entered into the raffle for a $25 Amazon Gift Card, please enter your
email below.
o _______________
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